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For this reason this [common] account does not follow. An example of this is that the condition with which the joining of the modality of necessity is correct is the condition “for as long as the subject is described by that which was posited along with it.” [It is] like our statement “Everything that is moving ( intaqala ) is changing.” For if you join with it the modality of necessity, it is necessary that you utter {an taqiila bi-lisanika) or say in your mind “for as long as it is described as moving.” Sometimes, it is not true to say “as long as its essence exists.” In the likes of such absolute [propositions], this conversion is a necessary consequence. Za’id (Cairo: Wizarat at-Taqafa wa-l-Irsad al-Qawmi, 1960); Ibn Sma, as-Sifa’ , al-Ilahlyat (2) ed. An important wit- ness of the Arabic text is the Latin Medieval translation (= 1), recently edited in the Avicenna Latinus series [Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina, HIV, ed. In the former, the Ildhiyat superseded to a large extent the Metaphysics itself. Third, Avicenna in these texts engages in a sophisticated type of exegesis: in paraphrasing the Metaphysics, he emphasizes the main points of Aristotle’s argument, quotes additional passages from the Metaphysics itself, and occasion- ally refers to doctrines of other Aristotelian works. In the first part, as a pre- liminary step, I briefly discuss huwlya as a philosophical term, and its use in what can be regarded as the most important Arabic version of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and in Avicenna’s Ilahlyat.

The correct [opinion] is that the converse of a necessary [proposition] can some- times be absolute, as your statement, “Every writer is a man.” Then you say, “Some men are writers;” and this is not in virtue of the [kind] of necessity which you want. And in their likes, if [the universal negative] The Sfa 3 in general, accord- ing to what Avicenna himself says in its prologue, is a work stem- ming from the Peripatetic tradition ; 1 2 the Ilahiyat in particular is 1 Ibn Sina, as-Sifa’, al-Ildhlvat (1), ed. In the latter, the Latin translation of the Ildhiyat, accomplished in the twelfth century, was acknowledged as one of the most authoritative interpretations of the Metaphysics. Speer, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 26 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 881-887; id., “Le citazioni implicite testuali della Philosophia prima di Avicenna nel Commento alia Metafisica di Alberto Magno: analisi tipologica,” Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 12 (2001), 179-274; id., “La divisione della filosofia nel primo capitolo del Commento di Alberto Magno alia Fisica: le fond avicenniane,” in La Divisione della Filosofia e le sue Ragioni, Lettura di testi medievali (VKXIII secolo), Atti del Settimo Convegno della Societa Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale (S. The following two parts are devoted to the analysis of Text 1 and Text 2 respec- tively.

Avicenna takes into account, one after the other, the four Kirmani, Presentation, traduction critique et lexique arabe-frangais de la Alubahatha III,” Le Museon 110 (1997), 170: “ipseite”); Risala ft l-Ahd (“Treatise on the Pact”), ed.

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Rather, if it is [by necessity], it is so in virtue of another necessity which is proper for everything that is contingent ( mumkin ). For the influence of the Ildhiyat on Albert the Great, see my ‘“Subtilius speculando,’ Le citazioni della Philosophia Prima di Avicenna nel Commento alia Metafisica di Alberto Magno,” Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 9 (1998), 261-339; id., “Albert the Great, Metaph. The main purpose of this analysis is to identify the sources in Aristotle’s Metaphysics of the texts I take into account.

IV, 1, 5: From the Refutatio to the Excusatio of Avicenna’s Theory of Unity,” in Was ist Philosophic im Mittelalter, ed. The com- parison with the Aristotelian sources will help to disclose the par- ticular meaning that huwlya assumes in Text 1 and Text 2, to emend in some passages the edited text of the Ilahlyat, and to show Avicenna’s quotation technique.

First, in so far as it corresponds to the Syriac hawya, it means, as the latter does, the present participle “being” in the sense of “something that 5 A fully critical edition of the Ilahlyat is still a desideratum. Marmura, “Avicenna on the Division of the Sciences in the Isagoge of his Shifa’J Journal of the History of Arabic Sciences 92 (1980), 244-245: “individual identity”).

The current edition does not provide an apparatus fontium. In a passage of the Theologia Aristotelis, huwlya is apparently used to translate the Greek tocotottiq (“sameness”) as well (D’Ancona, “L’influence,” 56, n. 8 See the indexes in Averroes, Tafsir, III:(97) (98), (231)-(232), (270), and S. Afnan, Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian (Leiden: EJ. SOME TEXTS OF ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS 29 the Metaphysics , Ustat’s appears to be the only one in which huwlya is employed as a rendering of ov. Outside the Sifa’, humya means “existent” in the Risala fl aqsam al J ulum al-‘aqllya (“Treatise on the divisions of the intellectual sciences”), where it occurs twice; see Ibn Slna, Risala fi aqsam a Pulum al-‘aqllya, in 77/ rasa’il Ji Lhikma wa-t-tabl Tyat, ed. ‘Asi (Damascus: Dar Qabis, 1986), 85.1, 89.19; French translation in G. Anawati, “Les divisions des sciences intellectuelles d’Avicenne,” MIDEO 13 (1977), 326, 330: “identite”; French translation in J.

9 Avicenna dubitat contra Philosophum, quando dixit quod particularis affirmativa contingens convertatur contingens, et quod necessaria particularis affirmativa convertatur necessaria, et quod universalis contingens convertatur particularis.

10 [He also disagrees with him with respect to the following claims:] that a necessary particu- lar affirmative [proposition] converts with a necessary [particular affirm- ative proposition]; * 11 that a universal contingent [affirmative proposition] 7 I.e., ad impossibile, conversion, ekthesis. 8 “Question IV — de conversionibus” (folio 363) in Quaesita in libros logicae Aristotelis in Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Cordubiensis commentariis I (Venetiis apud Iunctas, 1550), 361-379.I will substantially neglect a further possible approach, the theoretical one, and I will address the issue of the doctrinal continuity and development of ontology from Aristode to Avicenna only incidentally.Huwiya as a philosophical term and its use in the Arabic translations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and in Avicenna’s Ilahiyat In philosophical Arabic huwlya bears three main meanings. Z7C66 2003 181 '.5— dc2 1 2003044300 ISSN 0169-8729 ISBN 90 04 12978 2 © Copyright 2003 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands All rights reserved.13 For Avicenna, modal and assertoric propositions may yield each other through conversions depending on how one construes the proposition. In reality, it is not necessary that the converse of an absolute [proposition] be an absolute [proposition] without having any necessity in it. He writes: It is commonly believed that die negative universal affirmative [proposition] converts into [something] like itself [henceforth mitla nafsiha in this context will be translated “while retaining its original values (of affirmation and negation and truth and falsity)”]. Otherwise, let “No A is B” be false and let its contradiction be true, namely, “Some A is B.” [Then] let us suppose that “some” to be something fixed/ deter- mined and let it be J. The truth with regard to this is that this conversion is correct not for everything that is considered (yu'addu) among absolute [propo- sitions] but only for one in which the condition of the soundness of the join- ing of necessity is not a time /period which varies in individual [cases], but a concept other than time. PI 10 and P125 are not taken into account in c, whereas t is incompletely reported in the apparatus (I wish to thank J. Janssens for hav- ing kindly put at my disposal a photostatic reproduction of t). Peters, 1977]; Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina, V—X, ed. This is true in both the Islamic world and the Latin Middle Ages. Second, the comparison with Aristotle’s Metaphysics not only helps us to understand Avicenna’s ter- minology in these texts, but also allows us to decide among some variants in the manuscripts of the Ilahlyat? the situation with respect to conversion will be the same in all these cases with the affirmatives. The Ilahiyat is the fourth section of this work, and deals with the metaphysical science. 26 AMOS BERTOLACCI portrayed in the same passage as containing “the science related to [Aristode’s] Metaphysics .” 3 Therefore, although it is not a literal com- mentary on the Metaphysics , but rather a reworking of it, the Ildhiyat is deeply dependent on the Metaphysics , 4 In the present contribution two examples of the reception of Aristode’s Metaphysics in the Ildhiyat are provided.

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